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It is  with  great  pleasure  that  I have 
come  to  Copenhagen  today  to  inaugurate  the  first 
official  meeting  of  the  Danish  Chapter  of  the 
American-European  Community  Association.  And 
I  am  particularly  honoured  to  address  such  a 
distinguished  group  of  Danish  leaders  and  other 
fr(ends  committed  to  our  common  cause. 
The  European  Community  today  - only  a few 
weeks  before  the  second  election  of  the  European 
Parliament  - is  still  in  the  middle  of  a serious 
crisis which  threatens  its credibilitY  and  potential 
for  future  action.  The  next  European  Council  at 
Fontainebleau  offers  a  new  opportunitY  to  overcome 
our  internal  budgetary  quarrel  and  to  at  last put 
our  house  in  order.  Only  then  can  we  address  the  real 
Problem  which  is  what  sort of  Europe  do  we  want  for 
the  future.  President  Mitterand  spoke  of  his  vision 
of  Europe  in  Strasbourg  last week,  I myself  put 
forward  some  of  my  ideas  in  Florence  on  the  same  day 
when  I  was  privileged  to  give  this  year's  Jean  Monnet 
' 
lecture.  The  European  Parliament  - under  the  impulsion 
of  Altiero  Spinelli  -has made  its own  original 
contribution.  Thus,  the  bas1c ·material  ts  not  lacking, 
/What  we  need ~-
/ 
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What  we  need  now  is  courage  and  determination 
to  translate these  ideas  into  reality,  But 
this  is  not  my  topic  today, 
I have  been  asked  to  speak  to  you 
on  the  current  state of  relations  between 
the  European  CommunitY  and  the  United  States. 
My  message  today  1s  one  of  concern~  but  also 
of  hope,  Concern~  because~  in  our  economic  and 
trade  relations  with  the  USA~  we  may  now  be  facing 
one  of  the  most  tricky  periods  since  the  founding 
of  the  Community.  The  lists of  points  of 
contention- which  I shall  review  in  a moment  -
is  a  long  and  growing  one~  of  increasing 
difficulty and  imPortance. 
I  At  the  same ,r---. 
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At  the  same  timeJ  hope,  Because 
reasonable  men  on  both  sides  <andJ  thank 
goodness~  we  are  reasonable  men>  realise 
that  there  is  too  much  at  stake~ economicallY 
and  politicallyJ  despite  our  many  differencesJ 
to  allow  the  Community-US  relationshiP  to 
founder.  Two-way  trade  between  us  amounted 
to  around  $90  billion  in  1983.  The  CommunitY 
and  the  US  are  the  principal  Pillars of 
the  liberal  world  trading  system. 
The  Atlantic  Alliance  <even  though 
not  all  Member  States  are  members  of  NATO) 
remains  the  cornerstone  of  our  foreign  and 
defence  policies.  All  this  1s  too  precious 
to  be  put it risk  for  a series  of  sectoral 
bilateral  squabblesJ  no  matter  how  Important 
each  may  seem  in  itself. 
How  strong  then  is  the  Alliance? 
/Let  me r-
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Let  me  address  the  economic  aspects 
of  our  partnership·  with our  American  friends 
in  some  detail~ as  this  is  an  area  in  which 
the  European  Commission  1s  most  directly 
involved. 
As  I have  said~  the  list of  squabbles 
is  long~  and  growing.  Our  concern~  on  the 
CommunitY  side~  is  first and  foremost  with· 
the  growing  tide  of  protectionist  pressures 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic.  In 
February  the  Community's  Council  of  Ministers 
took  the  unprecedented  step  of  issuing  a 
statement  expressing  its grave  concern  at 
this  trend. 
As  that statement  makes  clear~ 
we  recognise~  and  are  grateful  for~  the 
efforts  that  the  US  Administration  has  made~ 
•  and  is  continuing  to  make~  in  opposing  a 
number  of  protectionist  initiatives.  We 
were  relieved  to  learn  on  6 March  that  the 
US  International  Trade  Commission  had  ruled 
that  allegations  that  our  wine  exports  were 
inJuring  US  producers  were  unfounded. 
/Similarly~ I  ..  ~ 
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Similarly~  with  the  recent  import  relief 
petition against  imports  of  flatware~ where 
the  ITC  also  decided  that  these  Imports 
were  causing  no  inJury  to· the  American  industry, 
~hese examples  show  that~  even  in  difficult 
times~  it is  still possible  to  reach  fair 
and  obJective  decisions.  But~  nevertheless~ 
a number  of  measures  against  imports  have 
in  the  event  been  taken  in  Washington. 
The  most  important~  from  the  Community's 
point  of.view~  were  those  in  the  specialitY 
steel  sector.  Here~  the  Community  introduced 
in  March  of  this  year  counter-measures  to 
offset  Cin  accordance  with  GATT  rules>  the 
effect on.the  CommunitY  of  the  import  relief 
granted  bY  the  US  Government  in  July  1983. 
This  followed  the  failure  of  lengthY  consultations 
in  which  the  us  side  was  not  able  to  come 
uo  with  an  offer of  compensation  which 
we  felt  1n  a position  to  accept, 
The  CommunitY  .1s  also  concerned 
about  a number  of  Import  relief measures 
.  I 
currently  under  consideration  on  such  diverse 
products  as  carbon  steel~  footwear~  copper 
and  machine  tools. 
/The  reauest - 5  -
The  request  flied  by  Bethlehem 
Steel  tn  January  1984  for  Import  relief 
action  against  carbon  steel  ·may  well  endanger 
the  cont1nued  Implementation  of  the  Carbon 
Steel  Arrangement  negotiated  between  us 
tn  october  1982.  This  arrangement~  reached 
only  after  lengthy  and  difficult negotiations 
between  public  authorities  and  industries 
qn  both  sides~  was  designed  precisely  to 
avoid  further  relief  action  of  this sort. 
We  therefore  look  to  the  American  authorities 
to  use  all their  Influence  to  avoid  a situation 
in  which  the  1982  Agreement  would  have  to 
be  terminated.  We  also  hope  that  the  us 
•  Government  will  use  tts  Influence  to  dissuade 
the  industry  from  starting ant1-dump1ng 
and  countervailing  duty  actions  against 
imports  of  PIPes  and  tubes. 
An  import  relief petition was  filed 
bY  the  non·rubber  footwear  Industry  In  the 
US  In  January,  Quantitative  Import  restrictions 
are  sought  for  a five- year  period~  and 
this  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  US 
footwear  sector  has~  1n  recent  years~  benefitted 
from  various  forms  of  import  relief. 
/It  ts~ 
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It ts  ~  of  course~ not  difficult 
~o understand  why  these  protectionist pressures 
have  arisen. 
The  present  high  rate  of  the  dollar 
has  by  genera 1 a·greement  ·reduced  the  compet 1  t i  veness 
of  US  industry  both  in  its  home  market  and 
Ln  export  markets.  This  has  led  to  Increased 
imports  and  to  a reduction  1n  exports. 
Last  year's  trade  d~f1c1t of  nearly  $70  billion 
is  expected  to  rise even  further~  to  $100  btllton 
or  more~  by  the  end  of  thts  year.  An  election 
year  is  liable  to  seem  as  the  Ideal  ttme 
to  draw  the  attention  of  politicians  to 
these  Issues  and  to  seek  relief through 
protectionist trade  measures  from  what  are 
basicallY  the  effects  of  macro-economic 
and  monetary  problems. 
This  general  phenomenon  has  been 
exacerbated  ln  traditional  sectors  llke~steel~ 
textiles~  footwear~  and  sh1pbu1ldtng  by 
the  realignment  of  international  competlt!vtty 
I  ' 
1n  favour  of  the  newly  Industrialised countries 
of  Latin  America  and  the  Far  East.  Here 
we  both  face  similar  problems..  The  necessary 
restructuring  and  ratlonalisatton  require 
a process  of  painful  readJustment. 
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The  temptation  will  -be  for  governments 
to  take  protectionist  measures~ and  to  increase 
subsidization~ as  a means  of  avoiding  further 
reductions  in  industrial  capacitY~  with 
all  the  social  and  political  consequences 
that this  entails. 
Neither  side  has  completely  clean 
hands  here.  But  there  1s  now  serious  concern 
in  the  CommunitY  over  the  awesome  pressures 
to  which  various  industrial  lobbies  will 
subJect. the  US  Admintstration  over  the  coming 
months.  The  recovery  1n  the  States  has~ 
unfortunately~ not  reduced  this pressure 
for  protectionism~  but  has  actuallY  reinforced 
. it.  ·rt has .. sucked  in  imports  to  the  us 
at  a time  when  recovery  is still patchy 
in  many  of  America's  export  markets.  The 
.  . 
list of  requests  from  industry  for  import 
rel.lef  and  other  measures  of  protection 
has  never  been  as  long  as  in  the  last  few 
months.  In  the  US  Congress~ several bills 
are  under  discussion  which~  if adopted~ 
could  lead  to  a further  protection  of  the 
.  ' 
American  market.  We  naturallY  look  to  the 
/U$  Government 
•,. 
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US  Government  to  do  all  It  can~ to  oppose  such 
legislation.  The  concepts  of  strictly bilateral  and 
sectoral  reciprocitY~ domestic  content  and  industrial 
targetting  which  these  bills would  Introduce~  would 
be  harmful  not  only  to  EC/US  trade  relations  but  also 
to  the  mult1later1al  trading  system  as  a whole.  Such 
pressures  must  be  firmly  resisted  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic~. Another  source  of  frustration  and  tension 
In  US/EC  relations  is  the  continuing  high  level  of 
US  Interest  rates.  This  requires  European  governments 
and  central  banks  also  to  keep  their  Interest  rates  . 
higher  than  they  would  like  to~  at a cost  to  the  general 
economic  upturn  In  the  Community.  And  it~has  led  to  a 
drain  of  European  capital  to  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic.  .  . 
The  coming  Western  Economic  Summit  in  London  - after 
Versailles  in  1982  and  Williamsburg  last year- will  once 
again  have  to  deal  with  this  particularly sensitive  issue. 
The  us  side~ for  its  part~ has  concentrated 
Its  criticism  on  the  so-called  subsidization  of  the 
CommunitY's  agricultural  sector~  through  which  It is 
alleged  the  CommunitY  is  taking  away  traditional 
US  markets  In  third  countries~ contrary  to  the  GATT 
rules.  This  had  led  the  US  authorities  to  1n1t1ate 
a number  of  procedures  against 
I  our  agricultural - 9  -
our  agricultural  exports  in  the  GATT. 
I would  like  to  reply  to  such  criticism 
in  four  different  ways.  First~  we  are 
not  subsidising  our  farmers  in  order  to 
boost  exports.  The  aim  of  the  CAP  is  to 
ensure  that  those  on  the  land  receive  a 
decent  Income  comparable  to  that  in  other 
sectors.  Most  developed  countries  - including 
the  US  - pursue  the  same  aim  through  their 
domestic  agricultural  policies.  The  instruments 
we  use  vary~  as  does  the  success  with  which 
we  achieve  this  aim.  In  the  Community's 
case~  real  farm  income  has  in  fact  remained 
stagnant~ or  has  even  fallen~ since  1976. 
We  have~  like  the  us~  been  confronted  with 
the  problem  of  over-production  and  surpluses. 
But.we  have  managed  these  surpluses 
in  a responsible  manner.  They  have  not 
been  dumped  willY-nillY  on  the  world  market. 
We  are  now  holding  record  stocks  of  a number 
of  products.  And~  as  you  all  know~  in  March 
of  this  year~  the  Council  of  Ministers  took 
a series  of  important  d~cislons regarding 
the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  aimed  at keeping 
agricultural  production  under  cqntrol  bY  limiting 
the  level  of  price  support  for  sectors  1n  surplus~ 
In  particular  the  dairy  sector. 
"  /Moreover~ - 10  -
Moreover~ despite  our  problems  of  over-
production~  the  CommunitY  has  maintained  its position 
as  the  world's  largest agricultural  importer. 
We  import  the  maJor  part  of  New  Zealand's 
butter  exports~  even  at a time  when  Community 
butter stocks  are  around  1 million  tonnes. 
We  import  1.3  million  tonn~s of  sugar  from 
the  Third  World  every  year.  We  are  one 
of  the  us  farmeris·be.st~  and  most  reliable~ 
. customers. 
Second~  we  traditionally export 
a number  of  products  to  various  markets 
around  the  world.  In  order  to  preserve 
this  traditional  role~  the  CAP  provides 
for  export~refunds to  be  paid  to  our  exporters~ 
to  make  up  for  the  difference  between  our 
internal  market  price· and  the  world  market 
price~  where  this  is  lower.  This  is  quite 
tn  line  with  existing  GATT  rules.  We  do 
not  accept  the  critfcism  that  the  Community· 
has  taken  an  inequitable  share  of  the  world 
market . 
• 
/AdmittedlY~ 
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Let  me  address  the  economic  aspects 
of  our  partnership·  with our  American  friends 
In  some  detail,  as  this  is  an  area  In  which 
the  European  Commission  ls  most  directlY 
involved. 
As  I  have  said,  the  list of  squabbles 
is  long,  and  growing,  Our  concern,  on  the 
CommunitY  side,  Is  first and  foremost  with· 
the  growing  tide  of  protectionist pressures 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic.  In 
February  the  CommunitY'S  Council  of  Ministers 
took  the  unprecedented  step  of  issuing  a 
statement  expressing  its grave  concern  at 
this  trend. 
\ 
As  that statement  makes  clear;~  ~ 
we  recognise,  and  are  grateful  for,  the 
.  ··i.'  ' 
efforts  that  the  US  Administration  has  made~ 
•  and  is  continu1n~ to  make,  In  opposing  a 
number  of  protectionist  initiatives.  We 
were  relieved  to  learn  on  6 March  that  the 
us  International  Trade  Commission  had  ruled 
that  allegations  that  our  wine  exports  were 
inJuring  US  producers  were  unfounded. 
IS 1  m.ll a  r 1  y, 
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tastlY~  let us  not  forget  that 
the  American  fatmtng  sector also  benefits 
from  a whole  range·of  measures  directed 
at  Income  protection  as  well  as  at  the  disposal 
of  surplus  production  and  export  promotion. 
Gove~nment spending  In  theJ·us  farming  sector 
1s  running  at a level  broadly  comparable 
to  that  of  the  EC  and  Its  Member  States 
<~ 30  b1111on  1n  1982). 
I have  devoted  most  of  my  speech 
so  far~ ·Ladles  and  Gentlemen~  to  the  issues 
which  divide  the  CommunitY  and  the  US. 
What  I now  want  to  stress  is  that  we  are 
also  partners.  Indeed~  we  cannot  affor~tnot 
to  be  partners~  and  we  certainly cannot 
permit  sectoral  trade  squabbles  to  put  the 
partnership  in  Jeopardy.  This  i  .. s equally 
true~  whether  one  looks  at  1t  from  the  bilateral 
economic  angle~  the  multilateral  economic  angle~ 
or  from  its wider  political  aspects. 
/First~  we  have  to 
I  • 
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First,  we  have  to  remember  the  underlying 
polltlcal  relattonshlP  between  the  CommunitY 
and  thei!US.  This  is  a central  plllar of 
the  Western  Alliance  and  reflects  our  common 
belief  1n  a pluralist democratic  system. 
where  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Atlantic 
Alliance  is  the  best  securitY  guarantee 
we  Europeans  have.  We  may  have  our  differences, 
for  example  the  Siberian  pipeline  Issue 
tn  1982.  But  these  differences  of  opinion 
are  only  normal,  and  healthy  among  allies. 
I cali them  "family  quarrels".  The  fact 
is  that,  when  the  chips  are  down,  we  stand 
together. 
Second,  our  bilateral  economic 
•  interest.  As  I have  said,  two-way  trade 
between  the  US.  and  the  Community  came  to 
about  $90  billion  in  1983.  Our  various 
bilateral disputes  concern  only  a small 
part  of  this  total.  We  are,  by  far,  each 
other•s· most  important  market.  Mofleover, 
this  mutual  trade  has  helped  preserve  stabilitY 
through  a period  of  unprecedented  economic 
and  monetary  upheava),  when  the  ability 
of  many  customers  to  pay  for  their purchases 
has  been  put  1n  doubt. 
/Third.,  ln  the - 14  ~ 
Third,  in  the  multilateral  sphere, 
we  share  a great  responsibility  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  open  world  trading  system 
and  for  the  continuing  expansion  of  trade, 
not  only  between  our  two  economies  but  also 
with  our  other  advanced  partners  and  with 
the  less  developed  countries.  We  have  to 
live  up  to  the  commitments  we  have  made 
together  in  the  OECD,  at  the  Wflliamsburg 
SUmmit,  at  UNCTAD  VI  and  elsewhere. 
The  United  States.and  the  Member 
States  of  the  European  Community  were  among 
the  founding  fathers  of  our  11oeral  world 
trading  system,  which  laid  down  the  baste 
rules  for  the  growth ofrree,  but  fair,  trade, 
and  for  consultation  and  dispute  settlement 
;n the  General. Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade.  More  recently,  the  CommunitY  and 
the  US  have  made  maJor  contributions  to 
a  ~urther refinement  of  the  original  system, 
by  working  our  a whole  series  of  agreements 
and  codes  aimed  at  a better  implementation 
and  interpretation  of  these  baste  rules. 
/The  Tokyo  Round 
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The  Tokyo  Round  of  Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations 
was  a maJor  success  of  international  cooperation, 
in  which  the  initiative and  leadershiP  lay 
mainly  with  the  United  States  and  the  European 
Community. 
The  idea  is  now  being  floated  of  a possible 
new  round  of  multilateral  trade  negotiations. 
The  CommunitY  is  of  course  in  favour  of 
I 
trade  expansion.  But  we  are,  equally,  under 
no  illusions  about  the  difficulties  which 
• 
have  to  be  overcome  if such  a new  round 
is  to  succeed.  The  worst  possible  scenario 
would  be  a  new  round  which  failed.  Careful 
preparation  will  be  essential.  We  must 
reinforce  our  effortsto resist the  tide 
of  protectionist  pressures.  We  must  live 
up  to  our  existing  commitments  concerning 
the  rollback  of  restrictive measures  already 
1n  force.  We  must  press  ahead  with  the 
completion  of  the  current  GATT  work  programme. 
Success  will  also  require  the  assurance 
of  a sustained  and  solid  economic  recovery~ 
and  improvements  1n  the  operation  of  the 
international  financia(  and  monetary  system . 
/And  we 
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And  we need  a broad  consensus  among  a  11 
GATT  partners  with  regard  to  the  obJectivesJ 
Participation  and  timing  of  a  new  round 
of  trade  negotiations. 
The  preservation  of  the  free  trading 
system  relies  on  continued  cooperation  between 
1ts  three  main  PillarsJ  the  USJ  Japan  and 
the  EC.  We  must  ensure  that  this  spirit 
of  cooperation  and  shared  responsibilitY 
.,  ' 
~onttnuesJ and·that  we  avoid  any  actions 
which  might  undermine  this  unique  free  trading 
framework.  In  oarticularJ  we  have  to  avoid 
testing  to  destruction  the  disPute  settlement 
procedure  of  the  GATTJ  bY  expecting  it to 
solve  our ·bilateral  dispute  by  legislative 
fiat~  when  we  were  unable  to  solve  them 
by  negotiation. 
These  are  the  stakes  we  are  Playing 
for  today~  as  we  try  to  grapple  with  the 
oo1nts  of  contention  between  us.  And  here~ 
!-·would  like  to  say  a word  to  those  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Atlantic  who  might  be 
,  I 
tempted  to  think  thatthe.stakes  are  not 
·worth  Playing  for~  that  Europe  is  a decadent 
and  1nward-lobk1ng  civ111satioh~  with  !neff!cient 
and  subsidized  Industries~  riddled  with 
/Internal 
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internal  squabbles~  an  unreliable  allY~ 
·and  unworthy  of  the  attention  of  a United 
States  whose  future  interest will  1ncreas1ngly. 
point  towards  the  Pacific. 
•  · · Tb  these  doubters  !:;say  this. 
The  Community  is  the  most  open  market  in 
the  world.  Imports  are  equivalent  to  over 
13%  of  our  GOP~ ·higher  than  either the  US 
I 
or  Japan.  We  have  not  hesitated  to  shoulder 
'  our  responsibilities  towards  our  less  fortunate 
neighbours  1n  the  Third  World.  We  are  importing 
more  non-oil  goods  from  the  Third  World 
as  a percentage  of  GOP  than  the  US.  Indeed 
the  CommunitY  absorbs  well  over  a third 
of  all  Thlrd  World  exports  to  developed 
countries~  more  than  anybody  else.  Of  the 
36  countries  on  the  UN  list of  the  least 
developed~  25  have  privileged  trading  links 
wt~h the  Community  under  the  Lorn~  Convention. 
As  regards  debtor  countries~  the  Community's 
record  1s  also  sound.  We  have  trad1t1onallY 
run  trade  deficits  with  the  principal  Latin 
American  debtors.  Our  imports  f~om Brazil 
I 
rose  on  average  by  20%  a year  between  1979 
•  and  1982. 
/Neither  have 
~.· 
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Neither  have  we  hesitated  to  shoulder 
our  international  respons1b1lites  towards 
the  free  world  trading  system.  The  CommunitY~ 
unlike  some  of  its trading  partnersJ  has 
lived  up  to  its  immediate  Williamsburg  comm!tment. 
No  r}ew  measures  of  protection  have  been 
adopted  by  the  Community  slnce.the  Will!amsburg 
Summit.  As  regards  the  initial ~ollback 
of  protectionism~  the  CommunitY  has  been  . 
in  the  vanguard  with  its proposal  for  accelerated 
Tokyo  Round  tariff cuts. 
•  All  this  has  not  been  wtthout  1ts 
costs.  An  open  market .imPlies  restructuring 
of  traditional  industries  to·reflect  international 
movements  1n  comparative  advantage,  Employment 
and  producttve  capacitY  in  the  Community's 
traditional  industries  drastically  reduced 
1n  recent  years.  To  cite some  examples~ 
em~Ioyment !n  !ron  and  steel-making  and 
other  metal-manufacturing  industries  in 
the  Community  fell  bY  23%  between  1976  and 
1982.  Employment  1n  textiles  fell  by  over 
25%.  (The  comparable  figures  in  the  US 
' 
were  20%  and  18%). 
· /Of  course 
" 
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Of  cour:se: restructuring  implies 
not  Just  running  down  traditional  industriesl 
but  building  up  new  ones.  Our  record  1n 
terms  of  Research  and  Development  in  industry 
tnnovat1on  is  not  one  which  we  need  to  be 
ashamed  of~  but  we  are  naturallY  anxious 
to  do  more.  Total  spending  on  R &·D  by 
the  CommunitY  and  its Member  States  1s1 
as  a percentage  of  GDP1  roughly  on  a par 
with  that  of  the  us.  The  Community's::Council 
of  Ministers  has  only  recentlY~ at a time 
of  stringent  budgetary·,austeritY~  decided 
to  adopt  "Esprlt"~an ambitious  programme 
on  R.  & D  on  information  technology. 
FinallY~  before  closing  my  parenthesis~ 
I say  this.  The  US  will  not  readilY  find 
elsewhere  a market  as  large~  stable  and 
reliable  as  the  CommunitY~ either  for  its 
exports~  or  for  its foreign  investment. 
~n· 1981  44%  of  US  direct  investment  abroad 
was  in  the  European  Community. 
/What  are  the • 
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What  are  the  operational  conclusions  thRt 
we  should  draw  with  a view  to  improving  the  present 
state of  EC/US  relations?  In  my  view  we  should 
do  three  things . 
•  First~ ·w~ should  not  get  lost  In  the 
nitty-gritty of  Isolated  trade  policy  measures 
and  gtve  them  an  Importance  beyond  all  proportion. 
On  the  cont~ary; we  should  try  to  maintain 
I  . 
a view  of  the  overall  importance  of  our 
relat~onsi try  to  understand  each  other's 
diff1culti~s~  and  make  our  respective  dectstons 
only  after full  consideration  of  their  wider  • 
economic  and  Political  tmpllcattons. 
Second~  we  should  always  keep  1n 
mind  that  we  share  enormous  Interests  and 
responsibil1t1ei  1n  ma1nta1n1ng  an  open 
world-wide  trading  system  and  In  applying 
the  rules  which  we  have  established  with 
our  main  trad~ng partners  over  the  last 
35  years.  The  competition  between  us  has 
her.ome  much  toucher  in  difficult economic 
times~  but  that  should  not  endanger  the 
'  fundamental·  economic  and  political  partnershiP. 
· /To  borrow '  .  '  ;  .  l 
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To  borrow  a metaphor  from  President-Reagan, 
we  are  all sitting together  in  a rather 
leaky  boat.  The  point  of  the  Williamsburg 
commitment  was  that  we  all agreed  to  stop 
shooting  more  holes  in  the  bottom  of  the 
boat,  and  instead  to  start bailing  out  the 
water. 
Third,  we  should  make  all  possible 
I 
efforts to  maintain  and  improve  our  channels 
of  communication,  consultation  and  mutual 
information  at  all  levels.  The  regular 
.contacts  which  we  started·a  few  years  ago 
between·a  group  of  US  Cabinet  members  and 
the  Commission·are  a particularly useful 
contribution  to  the  maintenance  of  that 
system  of  communication  between  the  two 
sides  of  the  Atlantic. 
In  this  way,  and  with  the  right 
Political  will  on  both  sides,  we  ought  to 
be  able  to  "cool  .1t"  and  resolve  our  difference 
by  a careful  policy  of  quiet  accommodation 
in  the  tricky  months  that  lie ahead  of 
us. 
./For  what  is  at stake . 
' 
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For  what  i~ at stake  is  more  than  Just 
90  b1111on  dollars  worth  of  trade  across  the 
Atlantic.  · 
We  firmly  believe  in  the  global  dimension 
of  our  relation  with  the  United  States~ 
an~ seem  to  have  difficulties  1n  impressing 
on  our  American  friends  the  same  sense  of 
sol1dar1ty  that  has.to  prevail  1n  the  field  of 
~  . 
~rade as  much  as  in  our  political  and  our 
common  defence  relations. 
Wbat  is  the  credibilitY of  an  Alliance~ 
ln  which  one  partner  allows  trade  relations 
to  sliP out  of  control~  thereby  undermining 
the  other  partner's trust? 
It may  well  be  of  course  that  the 
United  States  do  not  put  the  same  emphasis 
on  their  relation  with  Europe  as  in  past 
ye~rs.  A clear shift  in  US  politics  away 
from  the  Atlantic  towards  the  Pacific  has 
been  noted  bY  many  observers~  including 
•top  American  pol1t1c1ans.  ·Again~  th!s  may 
be  the  consequence  of  a,shift  1n  the  economic 
' 
balance  of  powers  in  the  world~ and  there 
Is  definitely a challenge  for  the  European 
CommunitY  here.  But  it seems  to  me  that 
/such  an  approach 
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such  an  approach  overlooks  the  importance  of 
one  fundamental  element  in  our  Alliance, 
which  1s  the  belief  1n  and  defence  of  common 
democratic  values.  The  day  we  forget  this 
there  will  be  no  more  Alliance  worth  talking 
about. 
We  1n  the  Commurilty·are  ful.ly  committed  .  . 
to  the  political  dimension  of  our  alliance,  there 
can  be  no  doubt··about  1t.·  Yet  we. feel  that  our 
American  friends  do  not  always  realise that  our 
geographical  location  puts  us  tn  a particular 
geopolitical  situation.  The  Iron  Curtain  is 
only  a few  hundred.kilometres  away,  The 
Mediterranean  Sea  is  our  neighbour,  opening  the 
door  to  Africa  and  the  Middle  East.  This  should 
never  be.forgotten,  not  by  the  Americans,  nor 
by  the  Europeans  either. 
The  US  must  show  understanding  for  our 
situation with  regard  to  Eastern  Europe,  with 
regard  to  the  Third  World,  too.  We,  on  our  side, 
must  be  seen  as  a reliable  partner  for  the 
defence  of  the  Western  world.  I  am  aware 
that  Europeans  need  to  make  an  effort  in 
•that  field,  as  I have  time  and  again  encouraged 
them  to  do.  Henry  Kissinger  has  recently  provided 
us  with  food  for  thought  on  th1s  matter. 
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I can-only  say  that  Europe  has  no  other  choice 
than  to  go  ahead  with  the  process  of  integration, 
which  entails at  some  stage  a common  approach 
towards  1  ts  own  defence.  ' I  know  of  no  effort 
~owards economic  integration  that  was  not  coupled 
with  a common  defence.  Politicians  1n  Europe  . 
begin,  I  believe,  to  realise this. 
Some  people,  looking  at today's  problems 
within  the  Community,will  no  doubt  wonder  where 
the  stimulus  for  going  ahead  with  the  process 
of  integration :will  come  from.  Obviously  1t  has 
to  com~ trom  Europeans  themselves: 
eJther  we  have  the  political  will  to 
·or 
play  the  role  that  we  think  we  should 
play  on  the  basis  of  our  economic, 
technological  and  human  potential 
we  shall  sooner  or  later have  to  restgn 
ourselves  to  remain  _no  more  than  a few 
wealthy  small  nations  with  little say 
in'world  affairs. 
r,  for  my  part,  hope 
that  Europe  will  still have  the  courage 
II 
to  take  up  the  challenge, 
/81 't whatever 
.. 
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But  whatever  the  outcome, 
.  there  1s  no  option  for  the  Community, 
but  on  the  side  of  the  United  States. 
After  all,  fundamentallY  we  share 
..  common  ideals  and  values, 
common  policy  goals 
and  very  largely  common  interests . 
. 
The  only  Question  is 
whether  and  to  what  extent  a more 
united  Europe  will ·have  a more 
· d~cisive influence  on  Poltcles 
- security,  foreign,  economic  -
w1thin  the  Atlantic  Alliance . 
' 